portrays Herder as remaining faithful to Leibniz's monadology. 4 Indeed, the linchpin in
Herder's argument in Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze is the rejection of the windowlessness of monads. Why and how this rejection was so obvious to Herder is explained below, a major part of the explanation involving how it had come to be so by his time. There are two parts to Herder's rejection of the windowlessness of monads. The first is the acceptance of real interaction between material substances, for which Herder drew on Wolff, Crusius, and especially the pre-critical Kant. The second is the belief in soul-body interaction. While this too had figured in the writings of Crusius and Kant, among others, Herder's originality lies in his particular conception of the soul-body relationship.
Philosophers in the eighteenth century operated within the same basic framework as Descartes and Leibniz in their reflections on the soul-body relationship, namely, that in which the soul and body were conceived of either as two distinct substances which needed to be related to each other (Descartes) or as a dominant monad and aggregate of monads, respectively, with purely ideal and expressive relations (Leibniz) . The solutions of influx, occasionalism, and pre-established harmony bear witness to this fact. However, while Leibniz's pre-established harmony explicitly denied any real interaction between soul and body, the relationship between the two was intimate. For Leibniz, no soul existed without a body and the soul-monad was the principle of organization and movement of the body, even if the body's actual movements and development were purely the efficient result of its own previous mechanical states and its unfolding qua complex preformed natural machine. 5 Herder agreed with the intimate connection Leibniz saw between the soul and body but rejected the idea of the body as responsible entirely for its own movement and growth. Leibniz of course had his reasons for his theory (the law of conservation of force, principle of substantial unity, principle of causal selfsufficiency) but these no longer resonated with Herder. While this is also true of other eighteenth century thinkers, who developed new theories of physical influx, Herder took a different tack and, as it were, merely modified Leibniz's own theory to allow for real interaction between the soul and body. That is, instead of seeing the solution in terms of how two distinct substances could be made to interact, Herder conceived of the soul as always attached to a body and intimately bound up with it, forming its principle of organization and motion via genuine interaction.
In this way, Herder can be seen to be returning to a more squarely Aristotelian conception of the soul as the principle of life and substantial form of the body, although mediated by important modern shifts. Chief among these is Herder's acceptance of the soul's essential nature as thinking substance. Herder's theory of the soul-body relationship emerges out of the combination of these two conceptions: the soul, as thinking substance, realizes its essential nature by constructing itself a body through which it interacts with, and through whose senses it acquires knowledge of, the external world. Whereas Leibniz had rehabilitated substantial forms in order to explain his dynamics through which the motion inherent in matter could be made comprehensible,
Herder dispenses with this role for substantial forms (thanks to his Newtonian-Kantian conception of matter endowed with forces of attraction and repulsion) and restricts them, like Aristotle, to the living realm. Herder is consequently unique among his predecessors and contemporaries in explaining the phenomenon of life not by recourse to plastic natures, hylarchic principles, or moules intérieurs, but rather by a modern-inflected conception of the soul as principle of life, eventually supplemented by his later endorsement of epigenesis. The importance of this aspect of his originality cannot be overestimated. It is not only the foundation of his conception of Bildung, Kultur, and his philosophy of history; it is also the innovation responsible for his later influence on German Idealism. 6 Herder's Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze von der Natur und Gnade comprises a series of five numbered critical reflections on elements in the first four numbered paragraphs of Leibniz's Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondés en raison. Leibniz opens the Principes with the statement: 'A substance is a being capable of action' and proceeds to define simple substances as having no parts and composite substances or bodies as consisting of collections of such simple substances. Leibniz further defines 6 On this see esp. Kondylis (1981) 537ff., 576ff. See also Heinz (1997 Beweisgrund that the internal possibility of matter and the laws of motion which 19 Herder himself notes, in the same passage quoted in f.n. 16 above, and again based on Kaestner (1765) iii-iv, Leibniz's conception of body as 'aus einfachen Theilen zusammengesetzt' and that 'wir uns in ihm [i.e., body] eine große Anzahl unausgedehnter Wesen verworren vorstellen' (SWS, XXXII, 211). This speaks more to the nature of our epistemological access to bodies rather than to their ontological status as real or ideal. Kaestner himself interprets Leibniz this way in the corresponding section of the Preface through the analogy of eyes which are too weak to see the individual stars which appear to us as a 'luminous patch' rather than composing the patch as parts do a whole; see Kaestner (1765) Herder's focus from substances or monads in general to the soul or Leibniz's soul-monad in particular which will form the object of Herder's attention for the remainder of this short work.
The upshot of the first section of Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze is a rejection of the Leibnizian theory of dynamics according to which there is no real interaction between bodies, and where bodies instead always move as a result of their own derivative active force on the occasion of an impact by another body or a volition of the soul (and where all those movements-whether caused by another body or the soul-are fully determined in terms of efficient causation by the series of previous mechanical states of the body and in terms of final causation by the laws of these series in the entelechies governing the aggregate of corporeal substances which constitute it). Leibniz's axiomatic commitment to the self-sufficiency, including causal self-sufficiency, of a substance, which admitted no external source of change of its state, simply no longer resonated among eighteenthcentury thinkers who had experienced the Newtonian shift. It is important to grasp accurately the difference between these eighteenth century thinkers and Leibniz.
Leibniz's mechanics, which plays out on the level of derivative active and passive forces, involves laws of motion relating to the movement and collision of bodies and transfers of force between bodies. For Leibniz, however, this interaction is only apparent-in fact, upon receiving impact, elastic bodies (the only kind for Leibniz) compress and rebound as if as a direct result of that impact but in fact each body moves entirely as a result of its own derivative active force, grounded in the primitive active forces of the metaphysical substances underlying it which change in accordance with the pre-established harmony.
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In this way, the law of conservation of force and the principles of substantial unity and causal self-sufficiency are preserved. Eighteenth century thinkers, in contrast, dispense with this metaphysical dimension as conceived by Leibniz and construe the interaction between bodies as real, not merely apparent.
Herder's rejection of the impossibility of real intersubstantial causation in Leibniz's philosophy, or of the windowlessness of monads, extends to Leibniz's theory of the relations between the soul and the body, which he explores in the remainder of Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze. Leibniz writes in § 2 of the Principes that a monad is distinguished from another monad 'only by its internal qualities and actions, which can be nothing but its perceptions (that is, the representation of the composite, or what is external, in the simple) and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies to go from one perception to another) which are the principles of change'. 23 With seeming approval
Herder repeats this claim of Leibniz's in the opening of his own second paragraph: '[i]n every monad, there must be different qualities; these are nothing other than perceptions:
representations of the composite, the external'. In doing so, Herder expresses his agreement with defining the soul at least in part by its mental power or faculty of representation. 24 But he is then quick to part company, continuing:
How are these produced from the inner force of the soul, entirely in abstraction from the external which exists? Where does the idea come from that a soul could perpetually dream up a world for itself, from its inner force, without this world existing, without the soul being able to contribute the slightest thing to its existence? Thus would thought be nothing real; it would be an image without a thing, a thing without being a thing; would this not thus be a contradiction?
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Analogously to his rejection of a body's own power to move itself, Herder dismisses the idea that a soul's perceptions can be entirely internally generated. be construed of as a machine writ large, nothing among its mechanical parts would explain perception itself, which is thus only found in a simple substance, a conclusion which is consonant with Leibniz's commitment to both the unity and causal selfsufficiency of substance. 32 This inability to account for perception mechanically, however, has no effect on the nature and content of those perceptions, which both contain multiplicities simultaneously and which follow one after the other according to appetition. That is, while the relations between the mind and the world for Leibniz are indeed ideal as in the mathematical model, the mind is not a mathematical ideal point but a real metaphysical point possessing multiple perceptions. 33 For Herder, however, there exists no essential incompatibility between the simplicity of the mind and its real relationship to the external world. On the contrary, both the sequence of the soul's perceptions and the multiplicity in each of them requires the latter. Herder thus devises a way out using Leibniz's own terms, suitably revised:
An in-each-other cannot be grasped in a mathematical point: and even less so a multiplicity of modifications, in a simple substance, which is considered entirely on its own. But if the latter is to have connections with the outside, as the centrepoint of a circle to the angles which can be drawn from it: well! these angles cannot remain what they are without the centrepoint and the centrepoint not without them. each distinct simple substance or monad, which makes up the center of a composite substance (an animal, for example) and is the principle of its unity, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other monads, which constitute the body belonging to this central monad, through whose properties the monad represents the things outside it, similarly to the way a center does. And this body is organic when it forms a kind of automaton or natural machine, which is not only a machine as a whole, but also in its smallest distinguishable parts.
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Herder's conclusion to paragraph three is based on this claim, where he moves from his consideration of the geometric example of the circle to the substantial reality it is meant to represent: '[a] nd what about a substance?', he asks, 'from whose inner force it must be explained that it reveals itself, that it appears in the universe, that it can become the centre of a mass.' 36 Herder begins paragraph four with his own explanation of how this substance, or soul-monad, becomes the centre of a mass.
A monad should be able to change its representations, and must change them according to its basic force. Now if these representations are, however, nothing but external connections, must not the ground of the perceptibility of the external 35 PNG, 598-99. 36 ULG, 226. and the ground of the ever changeable perceptibility also lie in the basic force? There must therefore also be an organic body, which becomes its [i.e., the inner force's] measure, and which can be no automaton in itself. The idea that the soul strives after new perceptions and needs an organic body through whose senses it can satisfy this striving was not new. Kant himself mentions in the Nova dilucidatio how all 'modern philosophers' agree that the soul's connection with an organic body is necessary, citing Crusius, who was, Kant notes, 'so completely of my opinion that he frankly asserts that the mind is bound by a law, according to which its striving to produce representations is always united with a striving of its substance to produce a certain external motion, so that if the latter is hindered the former is also In Crusius' radical view, beyond its capacity for thinking and desiring, the soul, like the body, possessed impenetrability and it is in virtue of this that the two were able to interact, as Kant outlines above. 41 In the pre-critical Kant, we see the struggle to make sense of soul-body interaction too. 42 Initially, in the early pre-critical period from the
Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte up until the Nova dilucidatio,
Kant had construed the possibility of soul-body interaction in keeping with the Wolffian conception of space (that is, space is the result of substances acting on each other). On this account, if a substance is a being capable of active force, the soul could plausibly interact with the body via its own inner active force and the effects of that interaction would be clear for all to see in the space to which it would give rise. 43 But Kant eventually comes to accept a conception of space that is intrinsically linked to the structure of matter (although it would be wrong simply to attribute a Newtonian conception of empty space to him 44 ) as a result of the essential nature and internal possibility of matter which is non-morally dependent on God, as explicated in the Einzig möglicher Beweisgrund. Now in this Newtonian physical universe, the only changes we know of are those which occur as a result of the forces of attraction and repulsion, via the laws of motion, between material bodies. The pre-critical Kant is thus brought to the impasse that the only way to conceive of the interaction between the soul and the body is, It seems that a spirit-being is present in the matter, with which it is combined, in the most intimate fashion; and it seems not to act on those forces which inhere in the elements and in virtue of which they are related to each other; it seems rather to operate on the inner principles of their state. For every substance, including even a simple element of matter, must after all have some kind of inner activity as the ground of its producing an external effect, and that in spite of the fact that I cannot specify in what that inner activity consists. 53 We know now that the Träume and the dilemma it posed with respect to knowledge-or rather lack thereof-of the soul marked an important stage in Kant's pre-critical development which led just a few years later to the separation of the sensible and nature that the soul must build itself a body through whose senses alone it acquires perceptions and knowledge of the outside world and becomes capable of thought at all.
As he writes in Plato sagte:
The soul enters the world: the power of representation is its essence: but it is itself entirely its thought -the obscure but most lively concept of its being fills it entirely: this is its world: in this lies everything: just as the whole world is a thought in God's being. […] [T]hus is it in this way that [the soul] prepares itself its corporeal being, just as God creates a world out of the concept of his self.
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God's relationship to the world is thus analogous to the soul's relationship to its body (we return to this point in the conclusion). Of course, this focus on the human notwithstanding, it goes without saying that for Herder there are souls at all levels of the organic world, responsible for the range of living beings that comprise it.
The second difference from Aristotle is Herder's conception of just how the soul brings about this process. Here he sides with the moderns, in particular, the Newtonian moderns, so to speak. Herder agrees with Kant that the soul does not relate to the body in virtue of some kind of impenetrability; rather, the soul is intimately present to the body, acting on it from within. The soul is able to harness the forces of attraction and repulsion, in a manner that does not necessitate impenetrability, and mechanically construct a body for itself. As Herder writes in the Grundsätze, '[j]ust like the planet-bodies in the universe are formed through the attraction-and repulsion-force: so too our soul the body:
and so God the world.' 57 At this point in his career, Herder offers no clear explanation of 55 Herder (1984) 138. 56 Heinz (1994) just how the soul is able to employ the forces of attraction and repulsion. In a brief outline composed in 1769, he writes:
Attraction and repulsion! I cannot explain them, I only observe them. They have probably formed the body: they preserve it: they are its essence, its nature [...] there must be a simple being that has a limited force to prepare for itself a body.
As force it attracts, as limited force it is repulsed and obtains a sphere: that is its formation: the formation of a body. 58 Herder's novel idea is based on the fact that what is ontologically primary for him is no longer substance, but rather force: it is in virtue of their fundamental shared element of force that the soul, as thinking-cum-forming force, and the body, as possessing attractive and repulsive forces, are able to interact. 59 In the 1770s, and in the successive versions of his epistemological treatise, Vom Erkennen und Empfinden, Herder will try to provide more adequate explanations of this interaction, which will involve construing the soul and body as both ultimately constituted of force, and thus fundamentally identical. But it is important to recognize that Herder's arguments for how the soul acts on the body, especially in the latter's formation, are different from those he marshals for explaining how the body acts on the soul-the first has more to do with active and motive forces, the latter with sensuous media and the soul as perceptually receptive. Herder, with one crucial difference: its relations with the body are purely expressive, since the soul never actually interacts with the body. Genuine interaction, as we have already noted, would have compromised important principles to which Leibniz was committed but whose physical or metaphysical necessity no longer resonated in Herder's day: the law of conservation of force, the principles of substantial self-sufficiency, causal self-sufficiency, and substantial unity, above all. 62 Although the soul's communication with the body was purely ideal, the body, as an 'automaton', was a 'natural machine'. In line with the preformation thesis, the body simply harmoniously unfolded itself according to the predetermined laws of the entelechies which governed the corporeal substances of which the body was an aggregate. The entire complex process, however, was, on the physical level, the mechanical product of entirely efficient causes, without the need for any directly acting immaterial principle-indeed, Leibniz famously claimed in
Considérations sur les principes de vie et les natures plastiques (1705) with respect to
Cudworth's plastic natures, 'non mi bisogna, e non me basta, because this preformation and this infinitely complex organism provide me with material plastic natures that meet the need.' 63 Leibniz was able to account for the complexity of the organic world by writing substantial forms into his very conception of a dynamic matter and combining this with the thesis of preformation, such that he had only need of series of efficient 62 Maupertuis, for example, rejected both the Cartesian conservation of motion and the Leibnizian conservation of force. See "Lettre X. Sur les lois du mouvement" in Maupertuis (1768) 270-74. For a discussion see Duchesneau (1993) 267ff. In chapter four (259-379), Duchesneau explains how, for Leibniz, the physical world and our scientific conception of it in terms of laws of nature is undergirded by architectonic metaphysical principles (of finality, identity of indiscernibles, and continuity). 63 Considérations, L 589. For a full discussion, see Duchesneau, 'Leibniz et le concept d'organisme' in Duchesneau (1998) 315-72. causes operating in a purely mechanistic framework at the physical level of explanation. Nevertheless, what is missing in such theories is the metaphysical basis so central to
Herder's early account by which the soul is the ultimate directing source of the forces invoked by these theories.
The remainder of paragraph four in Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze further exposes the implausibility of the pre-established harmony of the soul and body. If the organic body is conceived of as an automaton, then this amounts to positing the existence of a soul which must be able to influence its body in order to acquire and change its representations but whose body alone contains the grounds of its movements. 66 As Herder asserts, this would be a contradiction. Framing his criticism anew in the language of § 3 of Leibniz's Principes, the relations of a mirroring monad and a mirrored universe make no sense if there is no real communication between the two, i.e., if the monad's mirroring is able to be generated entirely from itself and if the universe is not actually reflected.
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There has to be an 'inner reason in each soul', Herder continues, why each part of the universe it oversees (i.e., its body) is there which does not have to be sought in a third being (i.e., God) as the ground of both. Filling in the terms he implies with letter symbols, 68 Herder asks: what would it be if the soul did not exist for the sake of the body and the body not for the sake of the soul, but rather both for the sake of God, for whom it was nothing but a game that neither existed for the other and yet both appeared to?
Again, Herder is invoking the spectre of Descartes' deceitful God from the Méditations.
In fact, Herder is on this point in agreement with Descartes for whom the actual union of the soul and body was a reality confirmed by our sensation of it, even if Descartes' dualism is otherwise inconceivable for Herder.
In the final fifth paragraph of Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze Herder turns to confront Leibniz squarely on the question of life itself. In § 4 of the Principes, Leibniz claims that there is life everywhere, joined to limbs and organs, and that each monad, 66 'There must therefore also be an organic body, which becomes its [i.e., the inner force's] measure, and which can be no automaton in itself: otherwise a would be posited such that it could not be without having to influence (würken) b, and b would in turn be posited as the sole ground of its efficacity (Würkung), which is a contradiction. Leibniz's influence, however, can also be felt in one further way: through his Platonist metaphysics. 74 The soul is not simply an Aristotelian principle of life, but rather a divine emanation of God himself. And it is in how Herder adapts the Leibnizian conception of the soul as divine, in how his conception of the soul-body relationship bridges the gap between spirit and matter, metaphysics and physics, that his real significance and originality lies. For it is here that can be seen most clearly how Herder's theory transcends philosophical accounts of the relationship between the two distinct substances of the soul and body on the one hand, and the biological theories of epigenesis and vitalism on the other. On Herder's account, God fulfills himself through realizing all that is possible in his divine thought and creating the universe, which includes the creation of finite human souls. These souls are necessarily joined to bodies which they construct for themselves analogously to God creating the external world. Through their sensuous interaction with the world and other beings, the language, knowledge, and culture that these souls then collectively develop, over the course of history, amount to a spiritualization of the material universe, which is thereby brought back to God. This account is worked out by Herder in the 1770s, and it will later exercise a profound 73 'mich dünkt, die Welt würde ungleich Einfacher und Vielfacher, wenn in jeder Monas der Grund ihrer Verknüpfung und aller ihrer Veränderungen ist'. ULG, 227 (emphasis added). 74 For a discussion of Leibniz's Platonist assumptions and metaphysics, see Mercer (2001) 173-254. influence on the course of German philosophy. For, as Panajotis Kondylis has argued, Herder's thought showed the way through to a reconciliation of matter and spirit, the physical and metaphysical, the sensuous and the normative, by construing the former in each of these dichotomies as the vehicle of the latter such that the dichotomies themselves dissolve. 75 The objective of this article has been to demonstrate how the seeds of this fateful reconciliation lie in Herder's early engagement with Leibniz, where it assumes the form not just of a reconciliation but in fact of a close connection of the Leibnizian realms of final and efficient causes through Herder's working out of his particular conception of the soul-body relationship in the little known piece Ueber Leibnitzens Grundsätze.
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